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put forward a series of arguments aimed at illustrating that implicatures and presuppositions, on the one 
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1. Introduction
In societies where certain social norms of tolerance, justice and social equality are widely ac-
cepted, there is a cost to conspicuously skipping them. That is why those who want to by-
pass those norms without raising suspicion engage in dogwhistle politics by using linguistic 
and non-linguistic mechanisms that allow them to keep up appearances in the face of pub-
lic opinion (Mendelberg, 2001; Albertson, 2015; Stanley, 2015; Khoo, 2017; Saul, 2018; 
Medina, 2018; Henderson & McCready, 2019; Quaranto & Stanley, 2021). For instance, 
some American politicians at times employ religious expressions in their speeches —not rec-
ognized as such by the entire audience— to draw the attention of the most faithful voters. 
But the purpose of this tactic is not just to attract the votes of the more fervent religious elec-
torate. It is also about exhibiting the speaker’s support of the interests of such constituents in 
a way that does not exclude voters of other religions, non-religious voters and even moderate 
voters of the same faith, all of whom may be reluctant to vote for a political leader who boasts 
about their religiosity by seeking the allegiance of the more radical religious sectors. Roughly 
speaking, dogwhistle politics is a communication strategy aimed at appealing to one part of 
the electorate without repelling another part of it whose support is also sought.
George W. Bush’s speech in the 2003 State of the Union is an example of this strat-
egy (see e.g., Albertson, 2015; Saul, 2018; Henderson & McCready, 2019). About halfway 
through the speech, President W. Bush stated:
For so many in our country, the homeless, and the fatherless, the addicted—the need is great. 
Yet there is power—wonder-working power—in the goodness, and idealism, and faith of the 
American people.1
For many listeners, the phrase “wonder-working power” means nothing, not so for 
evangelists familiar with the hymn There is Power in the Blood. By using such religious ap-
peal, George W. Bush earns or keeps the loyalty of one part of the audience without alien-
ating the other. Bush’s speechwriters, thus, devised inclusive communication techniques to 
persuade a diverse electorate whose ideologies might even be exclusive of one another. As 
Albertson (2015) shows, explicit or implicit religious messages are persuasive to members 
of the speaker’s in-group. For members of the out-group, in contrast, explicit messages are 
not at all persuasive, but implicit messages are as persuasive as an analogous discourse with-
out any religious reference.
Note, however, that dogwhistle politics is not a monolithic phenomenon. On the con-
trary, “dogwhistles politics” refers to a set of political manipulation mechanisms that share 
the same purpose but differ significantly in the way they achieve it. As we shall see, and fol-
lowing Saul (2018), the label applies to at least two different but closely related mechanisms 
of manipulation: overt and covert dogwhistles. The latter have received less attention in the 
otherwise limited philosophical literature on the matter, and many of the things that have 
been said about dogwhistles, in general, do not apply directly to them. Partly specialized liter-
ature and most media usually take it for granted that dogwhistles are code words with a kind 
of private meaning accessible for a subset of the audience only. A quick search on the Internet 




proves this. However, as I will show throughout this paper, this is far from being the right way 
to explain how covert dogwhistles work. In what follows, I will argue that covert dogwhis-
tles are neither a variety of implicatures nor presuppositions, two categories that are prima facie 
suitable for clarifying how some expressions have the potential to convey a coded meaning. I 
put forward a series of arguments aimed at illustrating that implicatures and presuppositions, 
on the one hand, and covert dogwhistles, on the other, differ in their linguistic behavior.
Section 2 is devoted to introducing the phenomenon of dogwhistling in politics, fol-
lowing Saul’s aforementioned distinction between overt and covert dogwhistles. I contrib-
ute to Saul’s taxonomy by introducing the different types of audiences that can come into 
play when a speaker engages in dogwhistle politics. Section 3 provides a case study for this 
paper. In section 4, I compare the linguistic behavior of implicatures, presuppositions and 
covert dogwhistles. Conventional implicatures and semantic presuppositions are not plau-
sibly deniable, while covert dogwhistles are (4.1). Conversational implicatures are cancella-
ble, calculable and plausibly deniable although at the cost of the speaker being perceived as 
uncooperative. In contrast, covert dogwhistles are neither cancellable nor calculable and are 
plausibly deniable without the speaker having to pay the price of being perceived as unco-
operative (4.2). Finally, covert dogwhistles, unlike pragmatic presuppositions, do not re-
quire mutual acceptance of its content among speaker and listener to be successful (4.3). In 
section 5, I put forward two simple theories, Khoo’s theory according to which dogwhistles 
are inference-triggers and my own proposal, based on Saul (2018), according to which cov-
ert dogwhistles are attitude-foregrounders. I argue briefly why the latter is better than the 
former. Section 6 takes stock of the phenomena discussed and draw some conclusions.
2. Varieties of dogwhistles
Dogwhistles are one of the many forms that propaganda can adopt. As presented above, 
one could hastily conclude that a dogwhistle is a speech act that necessarily relies on the 
speaker and (target) listeners mutual recognition of intentions. However, the speaker’s in-
tention and, what is more important, the audience’s recognition of those intentions are not 
necessary for a speech act to be propagandistic, nor, indeed, for it to be a dogwhistle. On 
the contrary, as in other well-known cases of propaganda, sometimes its success depends 
precisely on going unnoticed by the (target) audience (see e.g., Ellul, 1965, p. 27). Thus, 
dogwhistles can be intentional or unintentional depending on whether the speaker carries 
out the dogwhistle deliberately or not and can also be overt or covert by virtue of whether 
the target audience is aware that a dogwhistle has been issued (see Saul 2018). Saul’s dis-
tinction between overt and covert dogwhistles is a distinction between types of dogwhis-
tles. Both types involve the concealment of information but differ in whether the conceal-
ment concerns the target audience.
Overt dogwhistles: dog-whistlers send a message to an audience with at least two pos-
sible interpretations where one of them, “often taboo, controversial or inflammatory” as 
Henderson and McCready (2019, p. 223) point out, is coded and recognized only by the 
target audience.
Covert dogwhistles: dog-whistlers use certain expressions that evoke (taboo, contro-
versial or inflammatory) pre-existing attitudes in the audience without the audience being 
aware of it.
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Dogwhistles are aimed at an audience that is heterogeneous in its background.2 The 
dog-whistler thus exploits all this diverse background when dog-whistling (see Witten, 
2014; Khoo, 2017). Witten (2014) introduces the distinction between general audience 
and target audience to capture how the speaker takes advantage of the different distribu-
tion of background among the members of the audience. This distinction is crucial, but 
it does not exhaust the full range of audiences involved in dogwhistles. So more distinc-
tions are needed. It is also significant to make such distinctions bearing in mind the dif-
ferent types of dogwhistles mentioned above, as this will allow us to know better how 
they differ.
Overt dogwhistles involve two different audiences: the target audience, a subset of the 
general audience formed by those on whom the dogwhistle is expected to have some ef-
fect; and (what I call) the non-targeted audience, that is, that part of the audience for which 
the dogwhistle is intended to be ineffective.3 Thus, the target audience is made up of peo-
ple who openly support the ideology to which the speaker appeals, i.e., the members of the 
speaker’s ingroup. The non-targeted audience, on the other hand, is made up of (what I 
call) the oblivious audience: those who ignore the existence of the coded message4; and the 
mindful audience: those who are aware of the coded message even though they are not the 
intended recipients. The former is the manipulated audience, while the latter is the audi-
ence that detects the manipulation and can publicly denounce it. Let’s think about the case 
introduced in section 1. Bush’s phrase “wonder-working power”, which is an overt dog-
whistle, is heard by the general audience. The appeal to “the power of God,” that is, the reli-
gious reference, is heard by the target audience and by the mindful non-targeted audience.5 
The oblivious audience is the one who is deaf to the religious pitch.
For covert dogwhistles, things work slightly differently. There is no difference between 
the intended target and non-targeted audiences. And the target audience, which in princi-
ple could be the whole (general) audience, is oblivious to the fact that it is being targeted. 
Given the variety of perspectives encompassed in the target audience, it is possible to dis-
tinguish between a) those who become aware of the covert dogwhistle, albeit not necessar-
2 The background includes not only beliefs but also prejudices, stereotypes, idiolects, implicit biases and 
so on.
3 Note that target and non-targeted audiences do not necessarily match with the audiences in which the 
dogwhistle is in fact effective and not.
4 Overt dogwhistles are not necessarily about sending veiled messages. Sometimes it seems that they only 
serve for the speaker to attract the target audience’s support by showing her ideological stance through 
the use of a specific identity language (see Saul, 2018, pp. 362-363). Henderson and McCready (2020, 
p. 155)’s identifying/enriching dogwhistles distinction is suitable for capturing this dual function of 
overt dogwhistles. Both identifying and enriching dogwhistles seem to involve recognition by listen-
ers, recognition of the “speaker’s persona/ideology”, which make them overt according to Saul’s taxon-
omy. According to Henderson and McCready, on the one hand, by means of an overt dogwhistle the 
speaker can simply communicate her ideological stance without that being materialized in a message 
with a concrete content (identifying dogwhistles). On the other hand, the speaker can, besides signal-
ling her ideology, convey a message with a dual content: a conventional one, followed by the general 
audience, and a specific one only aimed at her in-group (enriching dogwhistles). 
5 The non-targeted audience may not have mindful members. So, the dogwhistle may only be heard by 
the target audience. When this happens, the dogwhistle is absolutely successful.
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ily immediately (mindful audience6), and b) those who ignore the existence of the covert 
appeal (oblivious audience). Among those who belong to the oblivious audience are those 
in whom the dogwhistle is effective and those in whom it is not.
Figure 1
Varietes of Audiences involved in Dogwhistles
Having enriched Saul’s taxonomy by introducing different types of audiences, namely by 
distinguishing both the oblivious and the mindful audience, we can think of Saul’s distinc-
tion between overt and covert dogwhistles differently. It is now easy to see that the same 
dogwhistle can be simultaneously overt and covert for different subsets of the audience. In 
particular, a covert dogwhistle can be overt for the mindful audience. The philosophical 
challenge that will concern us in the remainder of this paper is thus to explain how covert 
dogwhistles work among the members of the oblivious audience in which they are success-
ful. Before carrying out this task, I introduce a case study in the following section.
3. Covert Dogwhistles: Newt Gingrich and “the Food Stamp President”
Newt Gingrich, one of the candidates for the Republican Party’s 2012 presidential nom-
ination, was accused of using racially tinged language in labelling President Obama “the 
most successful food stamp president in American history”.7 This is an extract of one of his 
speeches during the campaign:
6 In covert dogwhistles, the mindful audience can include both members of the speaker’s in-group and 
members of the speaker’s out-group.
7 Several media outlets echoed the racial tinge of Gingrich’s statements. For instance, Juan Williams 
for Fox News https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hs6fIPgLX0Y, Matthew C. Nisbet for Big Think 
https://bigthink.com/age-of-engagement/food-stamp-president-the-science-of-why-gingrichs-race-
tinged-label-sticks, Debbie Elliot for NPR https://www.npr.org/2012/01/17/145312069/newts-
food-stamp-president-racial-or-just-politics, and Al Sharpton for the MSNBC https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=m_ulf7mslLg&t=84s 
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Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker, created millions of jobs—
it’s called paychecks. Over [t]here you have the most successful food stamp president in American 
history, Barack Obama. (Newt Gingrich, as cited in Elliott, 2012)
On the surface, Gingrich, as Reagan did before through the infamous “welfare queen” (see 
e.g., Haney-López, 2014; Stanley, 2015), was only voicing opposition to specific redistribu-
tion programs that, in his view, do not really help the most disadvantaged, but only serve 
to encourage laziness and perpetuate their dependent position while allowing free riders 
to take advantage of the good faith of taxpayers. However, even though no explicit men-
tion to race is made, Gingrich was primary targeting African American on food stamps. As 
Haney-López points out, “like Reagan and Fedele and countless others, he [Gingrich] used 
references to food stamps to push the poison of race into the public’s veins” (Haney-López, 
2014, p. 131). Expressions like “food stamp”, “inner city” or “welfare” are not expressions 
belonging to the idiolect of a part of the audience, as sometimes happens in overt dogwhis-
tles. They are expressions used by the whole community of speakers of a given language. 
However, there are expressions, including those mentioned as evidenced empirically by sev-
eral authors, that work effectively surreptitiously harnessing the racist attitudes of part of 
the electorate (see e.g., Gilens, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et  al., 2002; Hurwitz 
& Peffley, 2005; White, 2007). The associations between “food stamps” or “welfare” and 
“African Americans” root in racial stereotypes treating African American as lazy (Stanley, 
2015, p. 156). Stereotypes, but also prejudices and implicit biases, are crucial in account-
ing for the effect that these expressions have on a part of the audience. Covert dogwhistles 
do not send veiled messages, but rather “raise subject’s pre-existing attitudes to salience”, 
making part of the audience act accordingly without realizing their influence (Saul, 2018, 
p. 367). It must be emphasized that the audience’s unawareness that a speech act is bring-
ing to the forefront their pre-existing racial attitudes is crucial to making the covert dog-
whistle effective. As Mendelberg (2001, p. 210) shows in her analysis of Willie Horton’s 
ad, once the racist nature of the speech act or the ad is raised, audience attitudes begin to 
change again.8
According to Mendelberg (2001, p. 7), what leads dog-whistlers to omit a straight-
forward reference to the issue of race is “to avoid violating the norm of racial equality.” 
8 In the 1988 presidential election, Republicans launched an active campaign to favour their candidate 
George H. W. Bush and attack his opponent, Democrat Michael Dukakis. One of the issues that re-
ceived the most attention in that campaign was that of crime. Republican-related groups released an ad 
praising Bush’s firm stance on combating crime and criticizing Dukakis’ weakness in the face of it since 
he opposed the death penalty and supported the granting of weekend passes. The ad briefly tells the 
story of Willie Horton, a black man sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, who, in one of those 
furloughs, “fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbing the man and repeatedly raping his girlfriend”. 
There was no mention of Horton being black during the ad. However, his image appeared along with 
words such as “kidnapping,” “stabbing,” and “rape”. As Mendelberg (2001, pp. 3-4) points out, during 
the primary period, Dukakis was in the polls ahead of Bush. This trend began to change when Bush 
first mentioned the Horton story in June 1988. The most significant advantage in Bush’s polls over 
Dukakis came in October when the campaign focused vehemently on the Horton case. After the ra-
cial nature of Horton’s ad became explicit, the voting trend began to change somewhat, though not 
enough for Dukakis to end up winning the presidential election (See Mendelberg, 2001 for a highly 
detailed analysis of the case). 
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This norm translates into the public rejection of blatant discrimination. However, as Saul 
(2018, p. 364) stresses, this widespread assumption does not necessarily result in the elim-
ination of racism in US society. In fact, the commitment to this social norm, as Mendel-
berg (2001, p. 92) admits, is minimal in many cases.9 Therefore, this norm of racial equality 
is compatible with different forms of subtle, and not so subtle, racism, such as the grow-
ing colourblindness ideology, which, as noted by Haney-López (2014, p. 87), “bolster dog 
whistle politics”. Colourblindness ideology “[...] laudably envisions an ideal world in which 
race is no longer relevant to how we perceive or treat each other.” (Haney-López, 2014, 
p. 77). This may seem a desirable ideal in the fight against racial injustice. However, colour-
blindness makes invisible forms of racial discrimination experienced by racialized people 
and prevents us from perceiving the privileged status of the non-racialized (Medina, 2012, 
p. 38). Racist ideologies, whether proudly held or in disguise, are the breeding ground for 
effective implicit forms of racist communication such as dogwhistle politics.10
In the next section, I examine some possible answers to the question of how covert 
dogwhistles succeed in achieving their goal. In particular, I discuss whether a covert dog-
whistle is a specific sort of mechanism of manipulation or whether, on the contrary, it 
draws on other already familiar linguistic mechanisms such as implicatures or presupposi-
tions.
4. Implicaturist and Presuppositional Accounts of Covert Dogwhistles
At first sight, the Gricean model of communication, while successful in explaining conver-
sational exchanges involving cooperation between speakers, does not seem as suitable in 
accounting for cases of political manipulation through language. This is due, basically, to 
two constraints. The first, as we have already pointed out, is that the phenomenon of prop-
aganda in general, and dogwhistles in particular, often drives us to go beyond the game of 
intentions that we usually assume in ideal communication conditions. For instance, covert 
dogwhistles are effective when they go unnoticed by the target audience. The second has to 
do with the assumption that speakers and listeners will assume shared conversational goals. 
Again, covert dogwhistles in particular, and propaganda at large, challenge this assumption. 
Under normal conditions, the propagandist’s desire to manipulate clashes with the listen-
ers’ desire to know the truth (see Beaver & Stanley, 2018; Quaranto & Stanley, 2021). One 
could insist, however, that this framework remains promising for clarifying the nature of 
covert dogwhistles. In what follows, I will block this path and defend that covert dogwhis-
tles cannot be accommodated within either of these two mechanisms. To carry out this 
9 As Saul (2017, p. 100) points out, the norm of racial equality is to be understood as a very general one 
such as “Don’t be racist.” The norm “Don’t be racist” is general enough that each person who follows 
it can make her own interpretation of what it means so that many people will understand it in a clearly 
racist way, even if they are not aware of it.
10 After Trump’s victory in the USA (Bolsonaro in Brazil, Salvini in Italy, success in favor of Brexit, Vox 
winning seats in the Spanish Parliament, etc.) racism and sexism (the latter in the form of antifemi-
nism) now enjoy a level of tolerance unacceptable to our democracies. Predictably, the more tolerable 
racism, sexism, homophobia, etc., become, the less necessary it is to resort to disguised speeches such as 
dogwhistles. 
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task, I compare the features of the phenomena at hand by examining how they behave in 
the face of plausible deniability, cancellability, calculability and mutual acceptance.
4.1.  Covert Dogwhistles as Semantic Presuppositions or Conventional 
Implicatures
When a speaker says something, she communicates information at different levels and 
not always deliberately. For instance, if she says, “Mr X’s sister is a politician, but she is 
honest,” that utterance semantically presupposes that Mr X has a sister. Moreover, the 
speaker is also conveying via (conventional) implicature that there is a contrast between 
being a politician and being honest (see Grice, 1989/1995). This implicature is triggered 
because of the conventional meaning of the conjunction ‘but’. Thus, semantic presuppo-
sitions and conventional implicatures are mechanisms through which a speaker commu-
nicates certain information beyond what she has literally said. Implicated or presupposed 
content is a kind of conventional not-at-issue content (Murray, 2014; Stanley, 2015), i.e., 
a sort of information that is not “directly challengeable” and that “is directly added to the 
common ground” (Murray, 2014, p. 2:4). That Mr X has a sister or that there is a con-
trast between being a politician and being honest are not the issues under consideration; 
what is under consideration here is whether or not Mr X’s sister is a politician as well as 
an honest person.
According to Stanley (2015, p. 138 ff), a dogwhistle conveys a conventional not-at-is-
sue content. This content is expressive, i.e., its function is not to rule out possible worlds by 
adding new information to the common ground but to order the available worlds accord-
ing to a certain order of preferences. Our interest here, however, is not in the ins and outs 
of Stanley’s proposal. What matters for our purposes is to discuss the plausibility of the 
thesis that dogwhistles are intended to communicate conventionally encoded not-at-issue 
content via semantic presupposition or conventional implicature. The latter is the option 
that Stanley (2015) seems to favor.
4.1.1. The Deniability Argument
In this subsection, I introduce a version of what Henderson and McCready (2019, pp. 224-
225) call the deniability argument against those accounts advocating that covert dogwhis-
tles are conventional implicatures or semantic presuppositions.11 Let’s take Gingrich’s ex-
11 The same objection can be found in Khoo (2017, pp. 45-46), although he discusses cancellability 
rather than plausible deniability. In this paper, however, it is relevant to distinguish cancellability 
from deniability. I use “cancellability” here for those situations in which, after being confronted, the 
speaker denies the content suggested by admitting to having suggested it. Note that, so understood, 
cancellability is like a retraction. I use “deniability”, on the other hand, for those situations in which 
the speaker, after being confronted, denies having suggested what the audience attributes to her (see 
Mazzarella et al., 2018, p. 16, for a similar use of “deniability”). The distinction is important because, 
as we will see, it allows us to appreciate a different behavior of conversational implicatures and covert 
dogwhistles concerning no just deniability but also cancellability. At this point, however, overlooking 
the difference between the two phenomena has no noticeable consequences since conventional impli-
catures are neither deniable nor cancellable. 
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ample as a paradigmatic case of a covert dogwhistle. Gingrich’s speech act, one could argue, 
suggests something along the lines of “African Americans are lazy” due to the meaning of 
the phrase “food stamp”. A common feature of both semantic presuppositions and conven-
tional implicatures is that they cannot be felicitously denied by the same speaker (Beaver & 
Geurts, 2014; Davis, 2019). Let’s look at the following conversations:
(1) Dan: Mr X’s sister is a politician, but she is honest. (Presupposition: Mr X has a sis-
ter)
Dre: I didn’t know that Mr X had a sister.
Dan: #Of course you didn’t, he’s an only child! (Dan’s denial)
(2) Lucy: What about Mr X’s sister?
Naia: Mr X’s sister is a politician, but she is honest. (Implicature: There is a con-
trast between being a politician and being honest)
Lucy: I don’t think that politicians are dishonest.
Naia: #I’ve suggested no such thing (Naia’s denial).
As shown in (1) and (2), semantic presuppositions and conventional implicatures are 
linked to the conventional meaning of the utterances that trigger them in such a way that 
they cannot be plausibly denied. Covert dogwhistles, on the other hand, are not bound to 
the conventional meaning of the expressions involved in the speaker’s utterance. This is 
what allows the speaker to plausibly deny the covert appeal, as in (3):
(3) Gingrich: Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker, cre-
ated millions of jobs—it’s called paychecks. Over [t]here you have the most suc-
cessful food stamp president in American history, Barack Obama. (Dogwhistle: Af-
rican American are lazy)
Journalist: Are you implying that African Americans are lazy?
Gingrich: I don’t have anything against African Americans. Why do you think 
that? (Gingrich’s denial)
The veiled nature of covert dogwhistles sharply contrasts with the transparency that their con-
ventional character gives to semantic presuppositions and conventional implicatures. Dan’s and 
Naia’s denials clearly fail because of the conventional meaning of their presupposition-triggering 
and implicature-triggering utterances, while Gingrich’s does sound convincing. Plausible denia-
bility is one of the most powerful features of covert dogwhistles, as it allows the dog-whistler to 
reverse the accusation, for instance, by accusing the opponent of playing the race card.
4.2. Covert Dogwhistles as Conversational Implicatures
As we know from Grice (1989/1995), there is another type of implicatures, the so-called 
conversational implicatures. They are inferences triggered by uttering a sentence and ex-
ploiting the Gricean conversational maxims. Unlike conventional ones, conversational im-
plicatures are not determined by the conventional meaning of the expressions involved in 
the utterances that trigger them. Imagine the following situation. Bea keeps making funny 
contributions to the conversation. The exchange goes on like this:
(4) Amy: Bea, you’re funny!
Bea: I am from Tiflis (Implicature: People from Tiflis are funny).
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Bea’s conversational implicature (let’s call (b)) does not follow from Bea’s assertion (let’s 
call (a)) by virtue of (a)’s conventional meaning. (a) can be uttered in another context with-
out triggering the implicature (b). In other words, (b) follows from (a), in this context, not 
because of the conventional meaning of the expressions involved in (a), but due to prag-
matic reasons. Amy has to infer that what Bea means by (a) is that people from Tiflis are 
funny so that Bea’s utterance is taken as a cooperative contribution to the conversation.
To date, no author has developed a Conversational Implicaturist View of covert dog-
whistles. However, Marques (2020, pp. 125-126) has recently raised this possibility. Ac-
cording to such a view, Gingrich’s assertion would convey via (conversational) implicature 
something like the proposition that African Americans are lazy. What sets this proposal 
apart from the previous one is that the implicatum behaves differently owing to its uncon-
ventional nature. In what follows, I argue that conversational implicatures are not success-
ful candidates for explaining covert dogwhistles given how they both behave with respect 
to plausible deniability, cancellability and calculability, three distinctive features of conver-
sational implicatures.12
4.2.1. The Deniability Argument
On the surface, covert dogwhistles and conversational implicatures seem to share some 
central features. A conversational implicature, as noted above, is carried by saying that p 
not because of the conventional meaning of the utterance that trigger it, but “in virtue of 
special features of the context” (Grice, 1989/1995, p. 37). Because of this, they seem to be 
plausibly deniable. Consider (5):
(5) Dev: Where are my slippers?
Ravi: The dog is having a good time in the backyard. (Implicature: The dog is play-
ing with Dev’s slippers)
Dev: What? Is the dog playing with my slippers?
Ravi: I didn’t say that (Ravi’s denial).
Dev: So why did you tell me that the dog is having a good time in the backyard?
Ravi’s denial of having implicated that the dog is playing with Dev’s slippers is felicitous. 
It does not contradict the implicature-triggering utterance. Of course, Ravi is not cooper-
ative since his contribution is not an answer to Dev’s question, as one might expect. He is 
infringing the maxim “Be relevant”. And yet, Ravi’s conversational implicature is plausibly 
deniable––although the price to be paid by him is to present himself to Dev as being unco-
operative.13 Ravi’s denial in (5), while possible, makes his previous speech act an uncoopera-
12 In what follows, we will focus specifically on particularized conversational implicatures. Marques 
(2020) does not specify whether dogwhistles are generalized or particularized conversational implica-
tures. However, according to the author, covert dogwhistles are conversational implicatures that arise 
from the observation of the maxim of relevance and, as Levinson (1983, p. 127) points out, “all the im-
plicatures that arise from observing the maxim of Relevance are particularized, since utterances are rel-
evant only with respect to the particular topic or issue at hand”. 
13 Whenever the implicature is particularized and results from the observation of the maxim of relevance, 
the speaker’s denial turns her contribution into an uncooperative one, as the implicature is what makes 
the speaker’s contribution relevant to the conversation.
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tive contribution to the conversation. Gingrich’s denial in (3), however, is not perceived as 
a violation of any conversational maxim, and his assertion remains a cooperative contribu-
tion even after denial. The difference in how the speaker is perceived by the audience when 
she denies having implicated anything and denies having dogwhistled anything is a prima 
facie reliable predictor for distinguishing conversational implicatures from covert dogwhis-
tles. Still, it could be argued that this disparity is not substantial enough to make the case 
that covert dogwhistles are not conversational implicatures.
4.2.2. The Cancellability Argument
As we have seen above, another feature of conversational implicatures that set them apart 
from covert dogwhistles is their cancellability (see e.g., Grice, 1989/1995, p. 39; Potts, 
2015, pp. 183-184).14 Cancellability, as opposed to deniability, involves the speaker ad-
mitting that the audience would be right in attributing to her the content she has actually 
communicated if she had not cancelled it. Consider the following dialogues, the former be-
ing a case of cancellation of a conversational implicature and the latter, a case of cancella-
tion of covert dogwhistle:
(6) Ann: Sam does not like to work.
Tom: Well, she is African American. (Implicature: African Americans are lazy.)
Ann: What are you suggesting?
Tom: I heard myself, my bad. I didn’t mean to imply that African Americans are 
lazy. (Tom’s cancellation.)
(7) Tom: Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker, created 
millions of jobs—it’s called paychecks. Over there you have the most successful 
food stamp president in American history, Barack Obama. (Dogwhistle: African 
Americans are lazy.)
Ann: What are you suggesting?
Tom: # I heard myself, my bad. I didn’t mean to imply that African Americans are 
lazy. (Tom’s cancellation.)
Note that Tom’s cancellation in (6) is felicitous, even though one may well doubt his sin-
cerity. The crux of the matter, though, is that when Tom cancelled what he had implicated, 
he made explicit a piece of implicit information that Ann had already inferred, and that 
Tom presumed that she would infer. Hence, cancellation only makes sense based on the 
speaker’s presumption of the recognition of the implicated content by the audience. If the 
speaker did not presume the audience’s recognition of the implicatum, there would be no 
reason to cancel it. However, this is precisely why the cancellation of a covert dogwhistle is 
not feasible, as shown in (7). Cancelling a covert dogwhistle involves revealing a strategy of 
manipulation whose effectiveness lies in concealing it from the target audience. Conversa-
tional implicatures, unlike covert dogwhistles, work upon the basis of the mutual recogni-
tion of intentions by the participants of the conversation. Conversational implicatures are 
successful when the listeners recognize them, and their cancellation does not involve reveal-
ing any new information to the listeners.
14 I am here considering only explicit cancelability. 
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One might insist, however, that (7) is underdeveloped and argue that the content con-
veyed by the covert dogwhistle does take the form of a conversational implicature. It could 
be argued that Tom is suggesting that the Republicans’ economic policies are better than 
the Democrats’. While the policies adopted by the Republicans have served to “create mil-
lions of jobs,” the policies approved by the Democrats not only do not create jobs, but also 
discourage people from seeking them. The speaker, thus, implicates that there is a close 
connection between being a food stamp recipient and laziness. However, by calling Obama 
“the most successful food stamp president,” Tom is going beyond that: he is exploiting 
some stereotypes triggering an association in the audience between being African American 
and being lazy, as many people publicly reported. Now, can it be argued that Tom is sug-
gesting that there is something wrong with being a food stamp recipient, and also particu-
larly targeting African Americans?
Marques (2020, p. 125) appeals to the maxim of relevance to explain how covert dog-
whistles work and why they are conversational implicatures. Appealing to this maxim, 
however, does not allow us to account for Tom’s dogwhistle because cancelling the alleged 
dogwhistled content conveyed by the phrase “food stamp” does not render the speaker’s 
contribution irrelevant, as would be the case if the speaker were to cancel his implicature 
that there is something wrong with being a food stamp recipient. However, Tom’s puz-
zling cancellation in (7) may be due to something else. The successful cancellation of a 
conversational implicature sometimes depends on how determinable the set of implica-
tures compatible with the implicature-triggering utterance is. This is due to a feature that 
conversational implicatures sometimes have: indeterminability. As Levinson points out, 
sometimes an expression can give rise to different implicatures and it is not always possi-
ble to determine exactly which set of implicatures is compatible with that expression (see 
Levinson, 1983, pp.  117-118). It could be argued, then, that perhaps Gingrich’s cancel-
lation is infelicitous because the content cancelled does not correspond to the suggested 
content that most listeners have identified. However, the set of implicatures compatible 
with an implicature-triggering expression is not infinite. Only a certain number of im-
plicatures are reasonably compatible with what the speaker has said. Thus, Gingrich may 
have meant to suggest that Obama’s policies are harmful to the whole country or food stamp 
recipients insofar as they encourage them not to work, he may have suggested that food stamp 
recipients are victims of a harmful economic policy, that they selfishly take advantage of a de-
trimentally generous system or that they are lazy. But there does not seem to be any linguis-
tic element that together with the context would lead the audience to infer that anything 
negative is being suggested about African Americans in particular. Thus, Gingrich’s racial 
appeal has to do its job differently.
4.2.3. The Calculability Argument
Conversational implicatures and covert dogwhistles also differ in their behavior con-
cerning calculability. As noted above, conversational implicatures are calculable. As Grice 
points out, calculation is a process carried out by the audience to preserve the assumption 
that the speaker is observing the Cooperation Principle (Grice, 1989/1995, pp. 39-40). For 
the audience to calculate an implicature that p from what is said, they must be aware that 
the speaker conveyed p in the first place. The speaker, thus, has to try to be as transparent 
as possible so that the audience can infer p. Covert dogwhistles, however, are not calcula-
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ble. On the one hand, it is not necessary for the oblivious audience to infer a dogwhistle 
from the conventional meaning of the expressions involved and the conversational max-
ims to preserve the assumption of cooperation (see Levinson, 1983, p. 117). On the other 
hand, the speaker does not seek transparency to make it easier for the oblivious audience to 
work out his dogwhistle. Only when the covert dogwhistle has been identified can the steps 
leading from the main speech act to the dogwhistle be traced. But having the oblivious au-
dience spot the dogwhistle is a sign that in some way, the speaker’s strategy of concealment 
has failed. Thus, while a conversational implicature is successful when the audience recog-
nizes the speaker’s intentions and can work out it, the success of a covert dogwhistle lies 
precisely in the fact that the oblivious audience is neither able to recognize the speaker’s in-
tentions nor to calculate the dogwhistle.
4.3. Covert Dogwhistles as Pragmatic Presuppositions
As well as semantic presupposition, there is another type of presupposition, so-called prag-
matic or speaker presupposition (see, e.g., Stalnaker, 1974, 2014; Schwarz, 1977; Beaver & 
Geurts, 2014). According to this pragmatic understanding of presuppositions, and roughly 
speaking, “P pragmatically presupposes Q iff whenever the utterance of P is conversation-
ally acceptable, the speaker of P assumes Q and believes his audience to assume Q as well.” 
(Schwarz, 1977, p. 247) The emphasis in this definition of presupposition is on the speaker 
rather than on the linguistic meaning of the expressions involved in an utterance. Thus, 
pragmatic presuppositions point to a broader phenomenon than semantic presuppositions. 
The former include all sorts of assumptions by conversational participants such as that the 
speaker knows the listener, or that the listener understands the speaker’s language, and so 
on. So, pragmatic presuppositions are not necessarily bound up with the meaning of certain 
expressions. In what follows, I focus on those pragmatic presuppositions that cannot be ex-
plained as semantic ones.
4.3.1. Mutual Acceptance argument
A covert dogwhistle cannot be a pragmatic presupposition. The pragmatically presupposed 
content, whether it is part of the common ground or becomes part of it by accommoda-
tion, requires the audience’s acceptance to be successful, which would make it overt. This 
is so regardless of whether the content of the dogwhistle is common ground or not. Two 
scenarios can be envisaged in which pragmatic presuppositions prove to be unsuitable to 
account for covert dogwhistles: one in which the presupposition is already shared by all 
participants in the conversation, and a second in which the presupposition is not initially 
shared but is accommodated by the audience.
— Scenario 1: The speaker’s presupposition could already be part of the common 
ground.15 Gingrich could pragmatically presuppose that at least part of his audience 
15 Stalnaker (2014, p. 25) characterizes the common ground as “what is presumed to be common knowl-
edge among the participants in a conversation”, which has an iterative structure: “a proposition is com-
mon ground between you and me if we both accept it (for the purposes of the conversation), we both 
accept that we both accept it, we both accept that we both accept that we both accept it, and so on”.
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presupposes that the expression “food stamp” refers to African Americans, and that 
they are lazy. These two presuppositions may lead Gingrich to use the phrase “food 
stamp president”. But if that were the case, that audience would recognize that the 
phrase “food stamp” is one of their words, i.e., an expression that has, in addition to 
a conventional meaning readily accessible to all listeners, a non-standard meaning 
that can only be decoded by members of their in-group. So, the reason why a covert 
dogwhistle cannot be a kind of pragmatic presupposition is that in case the partic-
ipants in the conversation took those presuppositions for granted, the presupposed 
information would already be common knowledge and, the dogwhistle would not 
be covert, but overt.
— Scenario 2: The audience does not take for granted the speaker’s presupposition 
but, by hearing the speaker’s utterance, they add the presupposition to the com-
mon ground via accommodation (see, e.g., Karttunen, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974, 2014; 
Lewis, 1979). If one takes accommodation as a process consciously carried out by 
the audience, as “the result of rational responses to events that take place in the 
course of a conversation” (Stalnaker, 2014, p. 6), then the dogwhistle would no 
longer be covert but overt, as would be the case if the presupposition was already 
part of the common ground.
5. Two Simple Views
5.1. Covert Dogwhistles as Inference-triggers
Both Conventional Implicaturist and Semantic Presuppositional accounts characterize 
dogwhistles as code words. As we have seen, according to these views, covert dogwhis-
tles are expressions that encode, by implicating or presupposing, a piece of content that is 
available only to a part of the audience. Khoo (2017) puts forward his Inference-driven 
Account, as opposed to this thesis. He argues that dogwhistles do not code anything. 
Dogwhistles are not expressions with a concealed or implicit semantically coded mean-
ing. Instead, they are expressions that enable the audience to infer some harmful con-
tents. According to Khoo (2017, p. 35) “code words don’t work by being vehicles of im-
plicit communication; they work by triggering inferences which they are not used to 
communicate.” At first glance, Khoo’s proposal closely resembles the Conversational 
Implicaturist or the Pragmatic Presuppositional accounts: hearers infer something from 
what the speaker has said, which is not part of the conventional meaning of the words 
involved. However, Khoo’s proposal has the advantage of not requiring dogwhistles to 
have the hallmarks of either conversational implicatures or pragmatic presuppositions, 
thus eluding the objections raised to views that appeal to them. This proposal can be 
schematically depicted as follows:
— Explicit Statement: x is C.
— Existing Belief: If something is C, then it is R.
— Inferred: x is R.
Suppose that Explicit Statement is Gingrich’s utterance “Obama is the most successful food 
stamp president of the American history”, and Existing Belief is “Only lazy African Amer-
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icans use food stamps”. Then, Inferred would be something like “Obama is the most suc-
cessful president for the lazy African Americans in American history”. Thus, the phrase 
“food stamp” in Gingrich’s Explicit Statement provides the necessary semantically non-ra-
cial information so that, given a racial belief (prejudice) already held by part of the audi-
ence, those prejudiced hearers could draw a racist conclusion. Hence, dogwhistles are not 
code words, but inference-triggers. They are not code words, but they do have coded effects 
(Khoo, 2017, p. 49).
Although Khoo does not take into account Saul’s distinction between overt and covert 
dogwhistles, his proposal is consistent with it. He argues that the speaker’s utterance can 
have the above-described effect upon a part of the audience without being intended by the 
speaker and, more importantly, the audience can infer the discriminatory content uncons-
ciously (Khoo, 2017, p. 50). However, despite the virtues of this proposal, it faces two prob-
lems. First, as Khoo admits, his proposal has to deal with the problem of why two co-ex-
tensional expressions, A and B, contrary to what his proposal would imply, do not trigger 
the same inference. For example, while the phrase “inner city” raises racial prejudice in part 
of the audience, an extensionally equivalent expression such as “densely populated, high-
crime, urban areas” does not (Khoo, 2017, p. 50). Second, to my mind, Khoo has to strug-
gle with explaining how one who holds an explicitly racist belief, as his theory must assume 
to explain how she infers the dogwhistle, can change her attitude (her voting intention, for 
example) upon discovering that the dog-whistler’s speech act was racist.
5.2. Covert Dogwhistles as Attitude-foregrounders
As we have seen, according to Saul (2018), the function of a covert dogwhistle is to raise 
the (racist) audience’s pre-existing attitudes to salience. Bringing the (racist) audience at-
titudes to the fore is sufficient for some subsequent actions of the audience to be partly 
driven by their exposure to the covert dogwhistle, without the audience having to make 
any extra inferences.16 As I see things, the attitudes raised to salience can be both cogni-
tive (prejudices, stereotypes) and non-cognitive such as emotions (e.g., anger, resentment 
or disgust) or implicit attitudes. This would better explain why, like Horton’s case shows, 
the attitudes of oblivious audience can change again once the racist nature of the dog-whis-
tler’s speech act becomes exposed. Only in a public that repudiates overt forms of rac-
ism, but still harbors implicit racist attitudes (or explicit attitudes that they do not iden-
tify as racist), can a change of attitude be brought about.17 As Cappelen and Dever (2019) 
have recently noted, dogwhistles have (what they call) non-cognitive lexical effects, that is, 
non-propositional effects (see also Saul, 2018, p. 377). Dogwhistles “trigger pictures, mem-
ories, affect your mood, your motivation, and can change ‘the way you think about some-
thing,’ rather than the content of what you think” (Cappelen & Dever, 2019, p. 119). So, 
rather than inference-triggers, covert dogwhistles are attitude-foregrounders. As I argue else-
where (Torices, 2019, p. 152), the dog-whistler manages to raise audience attitudes to sali-
16 For Saul (2018, p. 377) covert dogwhistles are covert perloculionary speech acts. 
17 The results of test-retest reliabilities for discriminatory implicit attitudes are not always acceptable 
(r =  .5 with the minimum acceptable score being r =  .8), even though some improvements in meas-
uring the reliability of the IAT seem to yield more promising results (see e.g., Greenwald et al., 2019, 
p. 17).
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ence via associations. As Toribio points out, associations result from “reliable, reinforcing 
connections, as they are typically learnt by exposure” (Toribio, 2018, p. 42). Unlike infer-
ential transitions, associative transitions are not made based on the content of the associ-
ated items. They are acquired “mainly through conditioning and reinforcement” (Toribio, 
2018, p. 44). For instance, through the systematic co-occurrence of a linguistic expression, 
image or symbol with a stereotypical image or with clearly negative linguistic expressions.
A proposal like the one suggested here has several advantages. Firstly, as the infer-
ence-triggers account, it gets around the problems of the theories discussed in section 4. 
Covert dogwhistles are plausibly deniable, are not cancellable nor calculable. Plausible deni-
ability, cancelability and calculability apply to contents, not to the effects of those contents. 
Moreover, since the burden of their effectiveness falls on the listeners, this proposal can il-
lustrate why the accusation, to the mindful audience, of hearing something that was unsaid 
is compelling for a part of the electorate. The charge that racism is in the listener’s head and 
not in the speaker’s words is quite common when someone is blamed for playing the race 
card, and then a struggle for credibility between the mindful audience and the dog-whistler 
begins. These advantages are not exclusive to the attitude-foregrounders approach, but also 
extend to Khoo’s inferentialist account. However, the attitude-foregrounders approach 
can provide a simple answer to the first of the two problems facing Khoo’s proposal. Two 
expressions, A and B, can be co-extensional and yet rise to salience different attitudes be-
cause A, for instance, but not B, appears systematically in connection with a stereotypical 
image, etc. Unlike Khoo’s proposal, in the attitude-foregrounders approach it is not what 
C stands for in the speaker’s utterance “x is C”, but the very expression C, which does the 
work. The attitude-foregrounders view can also provide an answer to the second problem. 
Many people may harbor racist non-cognitive attitudes despite having explicit anti-racist 
beliefs. Covert dogwhistles can take advantage of such non-cognitive attitudes, for instance, 
racial resentment. When it becomes clear that a speech act serves to raise to salience rac-
ist attitudes, explicit anti-racist beliefs can do the job of neutralizing the influence of racist 
non-cognitive attitudes.
Finally, I would like to raise one possible objection to both proposals. Someone might 
reasonably argue that these proposals that assume that dogwhistles exploit the pre-existing 
attitudes of part of the audience cannot account for how a dogwhistle works in cases where 
its purpose is to elicit new negative attitudes (beliefs, stereotypes, emotions, biases...) in the 
audience on groups towards which that audience has not yet acquired a negative attitude. 
As of yet, however, there does not seem to be evidence to support this view. Covert dog-
whistles are not intended to make people racist, there are other mechanisms for that. The 
purpose of a covert dogwhistle is to take advantage of the explicit or implicit racism of part 
of the electorate. According to Saul’s analysis of the Horton ad, drawing on Mendelberg 
(2001), “while levels of racial resentment were unaffected by viewing the ad, the relation-
ship between racial resentment and voting intentions was strongly influenced by it.” (Saul, 
2018, p. 366). In other words, people did not become more racist after viewing the ad, 
what the ad succeeded in doing was to make that racism influence their behavior without 
many of them realizing it. This seems to suggest that the function of a dogwhistle, as Saul 
points out, is to bring certain pre-existing attitudes to bear, rather than to produce certain 




In this paper, I have argued that covert dogwhistles are neither implicatures nor presup-
positions. Unlike conventional implicatures and semantic presuppositions, covert dog-
whistles are plausibly deniable. Being plausibly deniable is a feature partially shared with 
conversational implicatures. However, while both conversational implicatures and cover 
dogwhistles are plausibly deniable, the speaker’s denial of the former, but not of the latter, 
makes the speaker appear to the audience as uncooperative. Furthermore, conversational 
implicatures are cancellable and calculable, while covert dogwhistles are not. Finally, unlike 
covert dogwhistles, pragmatic presuppositions require the speaker and listener mutual ac-
ceptance of its content to be successful.
I concluded this paper by outlining two simple theories for covert dogwhistles accord-
ing to which covert dogwhistles are not code-words, but they have coded effects. Accord-
ing to the first one, defended by Khoo (2017), covert dogwhistles are inference-triggers. 
According to the second one, with which I sympathize in line with Saul (2018), they are 
attitude-foregrounders. As I have tried to show, the attitude-foregrounders view can solve 
some of the problems that Khoo’s theory has to deal with. The attitude-foregrounders 
view, therefore, provides, to my mind, the most promising starting point for accounting for 
covert dogwhistles.
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